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ICANN: TRANSFORMATION OF APPROACH
TOWARDS INTERNET GOVERNANCE
by
VERONIKA ŽOLNERČÍKOVÁ*
Internet  Corporation  for Assigned  Names  and Numbers  (ICANN)  is  one
of the world's prior organizations governing the Internet. Since its establishement
in 1998  it  faced  criticism  concerning  the lack  of legitimacy  and accountability.
ICANN was also challenged because of the ongoing tight relationship with the US
government,  which  was  not  considered  to be  acceptable  by the rest  of the world.
The article  focuses  on the development  of ICANN  and its  approach  towards
the criticism.  It  elaborates  on the sector-specific  issues  regarding  Internet
governance.  And finally it  informs the reader about the process of transformation
of ICANN, which severed the link between the US government and ICANN.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The year 2016 was a year of change when it comes to Internet governance.
It is  to be  remembered  as  the year  when  the debate  over  the prevailing
substantial  influence  of US  on the management  of the Internet  escalated.
After  numerous  debates  on the subject  in the last  two  decades,  a shift
forward to more neutral  and independent Internet governance was taken.
The final step was executed in September 2016, when the newspaper stated
that  the former  president  of the US,  Barack  Obama,  had  given  away
the Internet. That is obviously a rather simplified statement. The Internet is
an intangible  object,  a network  incapable  of being  a tradable  property
and as such cannot be handed over. What happened from a legal viewpoint
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in autumn 2016 is that the contract allowing US to oversee one of the critical
functions  of the Internet  Corporation  for Assigned  Names   Numbers
(ICANN), an industry regulator with much power, has expired.
The focus of this  article  lies in ICANN, what  ICANN is and why it  is
an important entity in the field. This paper will clarify what its day-to-day
tasks  are  and what  are  the concerns  related  to its  neutrality
and accountability since it was established. Lastly, it will offer a summary
of recent development of Internet governance regarding ICAN.
1.1 INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES 
AND NUMBERS
ICANN is an organization based in United States and created as an industry
regulator  of the Domain  Name  System  (DNS).  DNS  is  sometimes  called
the “Internet  address  book”;  its  core  function  is  to translate  IP  addresses
into more  meaningful  form from the viewpoint  of an Internet  user.  An IP
address consists of string of numbers (IPv4) or numbers  and letters (IPv6)
designating the access point in a network. The point of origin or termination
is a certain device, for example, a computer. An IP address serves as a label
for that  device and allows other devices its  localization and connectivity.1
There are two IP standards, IPv4, which is widely used at present, and its
possible replacement, IPv6.  The stock of IPv4 addresses had soon run low,
and they had become a rare commodity.  The stock was exhausted in 2011.2
That  is  a reason  for implementation  of IPv6.  The new  Internet  protocol
offers an inexhaustible number of combinations for the foreseeable future.3
However,  IP  addresses  are  hard  to remember.  That  is  why  DNS
translates  these  addresses  into  what  we  know  as  domain  names,  such
as “google.com”.  It  is  unnecessary for the user to know the precise address
and location  of the device  containing  the desirable  content.
And the provider  of the content  wants  its  content  accessible  as  easily
as possible.  This  is  why  the provider  aims  to obtaIn an easily  memorable
1 Mueller, M. L. (2010) Networks and states: the global politics of Internet governance, MIT Press.
p.  230;  Bygrave,  L.  A.  &  Bing, J.  (2009)  Internet  governance:  Infrastructure  and institutions,
Oxford University Press, pp. 147–150.
2 The so-called free pool stock of IPv4 addresses assigned directly by the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority to regional internet registries.  Source: 2011.  Free Pool  of IPv4 Address
Space  Depleted.  [online]  Available  from:  https://www.nro.net/ipv4-free-pool-depleted/
[Accessed 10 May 2017].
3 What is Ipv6? [online] Available from: https://www.apnic.net/community/ipv6/ [Accessed 10
May 2017].
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domain  name.  As the full  name  of ICANN  suggests,  it  plays  a key  role
in the allocation of domain names.
If we look at the mentioned domain name “google.com”, we can see a top-
level domain name (TLD). TLDs can be either generic (.com, .net, .gov, .edu)
or  country  specific  (.cz,  .uk,  .at,  .no).  The first  are  designated  as  gTLDs,
the second as ccTLDs.4 It is within the powers of ICANN to establish what
is and what is not a gTLD and grant or not grant a ccTLD.5 Although it may
seem that there cannot be much dispute when it comes to ccTLDs, issues
may  arise  when  it  comes  to countries  or  parts  of countries  that  seek
independence but are not recognized world-wide.6
The mappings  between  domain  names,  TLDs  and IP  addresses  are
contained in a plain text file called the root zone file. 
“The root  zone  file  is  the master  definition  for the DNS  and contains
the authoritative list of top-level domains and the information needed to find
the authoritative domain name servers for each domain name.”7
Although ICANN is the regulator and coordinates the content of the root
zone file, the file is housed by a private non-profit company called VeriSign.
In 2000,  VeriSign  acquired  a company  called  Network  Solutions,  Inc.,
a government contractor, who had in a fact a monopoly granted by the US,
since it was the only registrar for domain names.  By doing so for an initial
fee and a yearly fee, the company made a fortune. The contract with the US
and all its perks succeeded to VeriSign.8
1.2 ICANN AS THE GOVERNOR
ICANN  governs  multiple  key  elements  of the Internet  necessary  for its
function,  either  directly  or  through  multiple  associated  or supporting
organizations. Among these some have been formally delegated by ICANN
and some  can  be  controlled  by ICANN  factually.  Here  is  a summary:
ICANN a) manages the IP address spaces, b) assigns addresses to regional
registries, c) creates and assigns TLDs, d) maintains the root name servers,
4 Bygrave,  L.  A. & Bing, J.  (2009)  Internet  governance:  Infrastructure and institutions,  Oxford
University Press, p. 163.
5 Ibid., pp. 147-148.
6 For example, a gTLD (not a ccTLD) .cat was created for the Catalonian community in Spain.
7 1987.  Domain  names:  implementation and specification. [online] Available from: http://www.
ietf.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt [Accessed 14 January 2017].
8 Koppell, J. G. (2005) Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple
accountabilities disorder”. Public Administration Review, 65, 94-108, p. 101.
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e)  maintains  registries  of IP  identifiers,  and f)  adopts  Internet  policies
and standards.9
That  is  why  ICANN  is  considered  to be  one  of the world’s  main
organizations  governing  the Internet.  The legitimacy to govern  Internet  is
not  bound  to one  jurisdiction;  it  is  neither  derived  from  any
of the established  international  organizations  nor  is  it  granted  to one
specific  entity.  Internet  governance  is  a complex  concept  being  executed
by multiple bodies with unclear hierarchy and usually unclear legitimacy
as well.  The model of Internet governance will be discussed in more depth
later.  Nevertheless,  a working  definition  is  needed  to clarify  what  I  am
referring to when I discuss Internet governance.  For these purposes, I will
use the definition that can be found in a report from 2005 by the Working
Group on Internet Governance,10 which goes as follows:
„Internet  Governance is  the development and application by governments,
the private sector and civil society, in their respective role, decision-making
procedures,  and programmes  that  shape  the evolution  and use
of the Internet.“11
1.3 CHALLENGES OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
Because of the rather special nature of the Internet, a need for more flexible
organizations is arising. ICANN is a new type of organization that is tied
deeply  to the private  sector,  yet  it  has  the unprecedented  power
to implement  a set  of rules,  which  will  then  be  followed  all  around
the world.  National  regulation  has  only  a limited  effect  on discourse
nowadays,  as  the Internet  is  the first  man-made  invention  that  is  truly
transnational.
The legitimacy  of an internationally  recognized  organization  should
derive from sovereign nations, which will then be bound by the measures
adopted by that organization. But the legitimacy derived only from the US,
and the relationship  with  the US  faced  criticism  from  other  countries.12
9 For detailed description of ICANN’s functions, I recommend Chapter 3 of BYGRAVE, L. A.
& BING, J. 2009. Internet governance: Infrastructure and institutions, Oxford University Press.
10 Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was initiated by the United Nations after
the World  Summit  on Information  Society  in 2003  as a response  to a debate  concerning
what  Internet  governance  is  and what  are  the respective  roles  of governements,
international organizations etc. in the Internet field.
11 2005.  Report of the Working  Group  on Internet  Governance. [online]  Available from:  http://
www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf [Accessed 12 February 2016].
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There  is  an effort  to sever  the bond  since  ICANN’s  standards  became
recognized world-wide.
ICANN is an organization that was raised from the bottom up. It was
never  officially  established  as a standard  setting  body;  its  beginning  was
merely  a group  of people  dealing  with the technicalities  of the Internet.
And eventually their task became more complex along with their powers.
Therefore, the legitimacy of the establishment of ICANN was contested
multiple times.13 The relationship with the US was one of the core problems
since its establishment, but not the only one. Another reoccurring issue is
the paucity  of legislation  defining  the scope  of ICANN’s  powers,  which
the international  community  would  prefer  to control  ICANN  somehow.
ICANN  is  limited  only  by memorandums  and affirmations  that  are  not
enforceable.  ICANN  is  constricted  by numerous  contracts  as  well,  but
again, with the US. There are no means of control beyond US borders.
The reason  why  its  limited  accountability  should  make  the Internet
community nervous, is because ICANN is a policy maker and at the same
time maintains exhaustible resources. There is a discussion within United
Nations about perceiving Internet access as a fundamental human right,14
yet the resources essential for it are limited and subject to trade. Therefore,
ICANN  is  an organization  that  is  a public  rule-maker  and a private
company with customer oriented approach at the same time. Those two do
not  go  well  together.  However,  there  is  not  much  of a dispute  when  it
comes to efficiency of ICANN.
2. MODEL OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE
ICANN  is  a non-profit  public  benefit  corporation  that  was  registered
in California  in 1998.  It  is  a corporation  with  no  public  authority,  its
autonomy gained through numerous  contracts.15 There are (at  least)  two
reasons  for the fact  that  one  of the major  governors  of the Internet  is
a private corporation set up in one state. The first reason is that the Internet
12 Mueller, M. L. (2010)  Networks and states: the global politics of Internet governance, Mit Press,
p. 64.
13 See Chapter 4 in Bygrave, L. A. (2015)  Internet Governance by Contract,  Oxford University
Press.
14 2016. Draft resolution on the promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet.
[online]  Available from: ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/d_res_dec/A_HRC_32_L20.docx
[Accessed 10 May 2017].
15 Bygrave,  L.  A. & Bing, J.  (2009)  Internet  governance:  Infrastructure and institutions,  Oxford
University Press, p. 112.
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was  originally  a US  invention  and as  such  it  was  managed  by US
organizations.  The second  reason  is  that  ICANN  and associated  bodies
were  created  with the sole  goal  to manage  the technical  issues  related
with the Internet.16 The unique  controlling  position  of the US  made  sense
at the time,  when  all  of the Internet  users  were  located  in the US
and perhaps  a few  other  countries,  but  not  since  the Internet  became
a global phenomenon.17
ICANN’s  primary  goal  is  to edit  the root  zone  file:  in other  words,
to manage  the DNS.  Having  an organization with  this  function is  critical
for the existence of the Internet. Before ICANN was established, the Internet
was viewed as a free,  self-governing,  politically neutral  entity. It  was not
until  later  that  ICANN  took  over  other  tasks  as well  and became
a centralized  body  controlling  the Internet.  This  transformation  was
criticized by the public.18
2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF ICANN
ICANN  was  not  built  in a day.  Its  main  goal,  to control  the DNS,  was
originally managed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
It was upon IANA to decide which domains would be marked as TLDs (top
level domains, such as .com) and how a domain name could be registered.
The first  public  reference  acknowledging IANA’s  existence  can  be  found
in a memo  considering  Internet  protocol  standards  from  1988.
The significance of the root file was yet to be discovered, hence there was no
public scrutiny concerning IANA’s establishment and who was in charge.
It was  one  Jon  Postel,  a UCLA19 graduate  student,  working
in the Information Science Institute, who was enlisted as an IANA contact
in the memo.
Jon Postel’s  task was  to coordinate  the Internet protocol and assign IP
numbers  and domain  names.  Therefore,  it  was  solely  in his  hands,
as the head of the department, to decide which TLDs would be created. He
was also personally registering domain names.20
16 More on establishment of ICANN in Mueller, M. (2002)  Ruling the root: Internet governance
and the taming of cyberspace, MIT Press.
17 Froomkin,  A.  M.  (2011)  Almost  Free:  an Analysis  of ICANN`s  ‘Affirmation
of Commitments’. Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9, p. 194.
18 Mueller, M. L. (2010) Networks and states: the global politics of Internet governance, MIT Press,
p. 64.
19 The University of California in Los Angeles.
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In these days, IANA was working on consensus based procedures, when
it  came  to adoption  of Internet  standards.  This  pleased  the Internet
community,  however  the situation  changed  once  the US  Government
gained more control over IANA. Under a series of contracts, control passed
to The US  Department  of Commerce.21 A wave  of criticism  followed.
An important question was raised. Is any government entitled to legitimize
an organization governing a world-wide rare resource, and if so, why is it
only one government on its own?22 The response of the US was to privatize
IANA by creating ICANN, a private company, which officially took control
over IANA’s functions in 199923 when the government’s contracts expired.
2.2 SELF-REGULATING INDUSTRY
There is not one central  body governing the Internet.24 The task is spread
amongst multiple bodies with various backgrounds, and ICANN is just one
of them.  Whereas  the opinions  on the efficiency  of this  system  differ,
the validity  of delegation  of power  to these  bodies  is  widely  deemed
questionable; the same goes for their accountability.
On the basis  of a closer  look  into  this  industry,  it  can  be  said  that
legitimacy  issues  are  a sector  specific  problem.25 Most  of the governing
bodies  were  raised  from  the bottom-up,  and they  were  not  formed
with the purpose to adopt rules. Their focus lies on the technicalities; they
were  established to deal  with  the functions of the Internet,  not  with rule-
making. However, in this industry, resolving of technical issues goes hand
in hand  with  setting  binding  standards.  As  a user  of the Internet,  you
cannot freely decide not to follow these standards, not because you can be
legally  punished  for it,  but  because  you  will  be  disconnected
from the network  (except  for those  parts  which follow the same  standard
as you  do).  Alternative  standards  do  exist,  but  only  one  standard  is
accepted globally.
20 More  on conduct  of ICANN  during  the early  days  and Jon  Postel`s  role  can  be  found
in Mueller,  M.  (2002)  Ruling  the root:  Internet  governance  and the taming  of cyberspace,  MIT
Press.  Bygrave,  L.  A.  & Bing,  J.  (2009)  Internet  governance:  Infrastructure  and institutions,
Oxford University Press.
21 Froomkin, A. M. (2003) Habermas@ discourse. net: Toward a critical theory of cyberspace.
Harvard Law Review, 116, 749-873., pp. 840 – 841.
22 Ibid., p. 94.
23 Bygrave,  L.  A. & Bing, J.  (2009)  Internet  governance:  Infrastructure and institutions,  Oxford
University Press, p. 102.
24 Ibid., p. 92.
25 See also Bonnici, J. P. M. (2008) Self-regulation in cyberspace, Cambridge University Press.
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Another thing that resulted from the rather uncommon nature of these
governing bodies is that their roots lie originally in research facilities. Also,
these  facilities  were  connected  with  the US  government,  since  the US  is
the place  where  the project  unwound.  In the beginning,  the Internet  was
just a project; it was not until later that its significance exceeded US borders.
Thereafter,  the people  working  on the development  of the Internet,
engineers and researchers, continued working in those bodies and adopted
decisions even after their significance expanded.
That  is  how  this  so-called  self-regulating  industry  emerged.  One
of the characteristics of self-regulation is that the rules are adopted by those
who  are  taking  part  in the activity.  The main advantage  of this  system
of regulation is that it is more flexible.26 It allows skipping the middle man.
If you  are  a part  of that  industry,  you  have  the best  notion  of what  is
needed. You are the expert and the rule-maker at the same time.
One  of the examples  of such  organization  is  IETF,  the Internet
Engineering Task Force. ICANN is considered to be a self-regulatory body
as well, but with one exception: there is a state intervening in its affairs.27
That  is  generally  considered  to be  a disqualification  for a self-regulating
organization.  But,  as  stated  earlier,  ICANN  is  of a rather  special  nature
and does not fit in any categories. 
This  system  of self-regulation  puts  above  all  its  ability  to implement
a wide variety of its member’s interests into its policy. It is run by a group
of people that are themselves vested in the subject matter and on the basis
of their  experiences  adopt  regulation  concerning  their  common  interest.
This  is  called  a semi-autonomous  social  field  (SASF)28,  and the rules
adopted  in that  field  are  binding  for its  members.  On the one  hand,
if members adopt the rules themselves, they are more likely to be satisfied
with them.  On the other hand,  are all  of the affected parties truly present
or just  “most”  of them?  All  interests  should  be  represented  equally,
and if not, the effectively and legitimacy of that system can be doubted.29
26 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
27 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
28 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
29 Ibid., p. 102.
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2.3 INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE AS A ROLE MODEL
IETF is another self-regulating organization operating on the Internet field.
IETF deals with standard-setting processes; its first meeting, held in 1986,
was  attended  by 21  US  government  officials.  Since  1991,  these  meetings
became  open  to non-governmental  organizations  as  well,  and later
the organization  became  independent  from  the US  government.30 That
constitutes the biggest difference between IETF and ICANN.
IETF does not have regular members; it is made of volunteers. Meetings
of IETF  are  open  to all,  and everyone  can  join its  mailing  list  and help
develop Internet  standards.  Everyone,  without  discrimination,  has  a say.
When ICANN was formed it sought to enjoy the same source of legitimacy
as IETF.31 ICANN considers IETF to be an exemplary model of what a self-
governing  multistakeholder  organization  should  look  like.32 What  is
a stakeholder?  A person, group or organization that has vested its interest
or stake  in organizations  like  ICANN  or IETF  because  it  is  capable
of affecting  the organization  or/and  being  affected  by it.33 Therefore,
a multistakeholder  organization  is  such  an organization  that  allows
multiple entities to influence its decisions.
Following  IETF’s  model,  ICANN  also  opened  the discussion
for volunteers,  and its  meetings are public.  However,  it  is  facing critique
for making  it  hard  for an ordinary  user  to be  truly  heard.  Unlike  IETF,
ICANN  does  not  discuss  its  matters  on the Internet;  therefore  one  must
attend meetings of ICANN, which take place all around the world.
Furthermore, IETF is a standard setting body, whereas ICANN is a body
governing  a rare  resource  with  the potential  to affect  competition  by its
actions.  It  manages  a public  resource  on one  hand;  on the other,  it  is
a private company capable of generating profit and has a customer driven
approach as well.
30 Internet  Engineering  Task  Force. [online]  Available from:  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Internet_Engineering_Task_Force [Accessed 14 December 2016].
31 Froomkin, A. M. (2003) Habermas@ discourse. net: Toward a critical theory of cyberspace.
Harvard Law Review, 116, 749-873., pp. 842 – 843.
32 Ibid., pp. 843 – 844.
33 2014.  Cross  Community  Working  Group  (CCWG) Charter. [online]  Available from:  https://
www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-11-05-en [Accessed 14 January 2017], p. 2.
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3. ACCOUNTABILITY
Even  though  ICANN  is  one  of few  organizations  operating  in the field
of Internet  governance,  and we  already  established  that  the nature  of all
of these  organizations  is  uncommon,  ICANN  faced  criticism  the most.
ICANN chose to apply the multistakeholder model the same as IETF, but it
did  not  treat  all  of the voices  alike.  So,  unlike  IETF,  it  did  not  have
the public  behind all  of its  actions.  It  did  not  have  international  support
either, since the only sovereign capable of controlling ICANN was the US.
And the US itself was step by step losing control  over ICANN, although
for a good reason: to satisfy other countries and to support the idea of truly
independent organization.
As a result, ICANN was repetitively accused of being unaccountable.34
But to whom should be ICANN accountable? And what do we mean, when
we talk about „accountability“?
3.1 FIVE DIMENSIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY
In 2005,  an article  discussing  ICANN  accountability  was  written
by Jonathan  GS  Koppell.  The mentioned  article  is  called  “Pathologies
of Accountability:  ICANN  and the Challenge  of ‘Multiple  Accountabilities
Disorder’”.35 Accountability  in Koppell’s  perspective  reflects  one’s
understanding  of the place  of bureaucracy  in a democratic  state.36 Those
who  exercise  power  are  bound  to exercise  it  within  external  means
and internal  norms.  Therefore,  they  are  accountable  for performing  their
actions within these borders. But each individual is accountable by different
means,  to different  entities  and with  different  consequences  arising
from the breach  of these  constraints.  That  is  why Koppell  states  that  it  is
unfortunate  to use  one  word  to describe  several  conditions,  which  may
or may not be found all together.
Koppell  then  describes  five  dimensions  of accountability  that  are
generally  referred  to when  talking  about  accountability.  The typology  is
34 See Chapter 4 in Bygrave,  L.  A. (2015)  Internet  Governance by Contract,  Oxford University
Press.
35 Koppell’s article includes case study of ICANN and it shows very well the problem it is
dealing  with. ICANN accountability is  suffering from something that  Koppell  describes
as “multiple accountabilities disorder”. It will serve to our purpose of defining accountability
within  ICANN  well;  nevertheless,  keep  in mind,  that  some  of the issues  with  ICANN
mentioned in Koppell’s article itself are already resolved.
36 Koppell, J. G. (2005) Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple
accountabilities disorder”. Public Administration Review, 65, 94-108, p. 94.
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as follows: an organization is 1) transparent, when it reveals facts about its
performance,  2)  liable  when  it  faces  the consequences  of its  actions,
3) controllable,  if  it  follows  the orders  of a principal,  4)  responsible,  if  it
follows the rules and 5) responsive, when it is able to fulfil the demands.37
Koppell  further  elaborates  on the typology.  He  stresses  that
transparency  is  an important  instrument  for assessing  a company’s
performance,  since  transparent  organizations  explain  or account  for their
actions and therefore admit mistakes and do not avoid scrutiny.38
Liability  follows  transparency.  An entity  is  liable  when  it  faces
the consequences  of its  actions,  is  punished  for unlawful  behaviour  or  is
rewarded for success. In the public sector, it relates to elected officials, who
can be punished by removal from their office.  For example, judges are not
liable  in this  sense.  In the private  sector,  managers  are  rewarded
on the basis of their performance.39
Controllability  requires  the existence  of another  entity  that  has
the power  to induce  behaviour  on an organization,  resulting
in accountability of that  organization  to the controlling  entity.
The organization is constrained by the commands of the principal.40
On the other hand, if the actions of the organization are bound by laws,
rules and norms (including professional standards, company policies), not
by commands, we talk about responsibility.41
Finally,  we  have  responsiveness,  which  is  contrary  to controllability
and responsibility,  a horizontal  type  of accountability.  A company  is
responsive when its policy has a customer-oriented approach and when its
attention focuses on the needs of its constituents.42
3.2 ICANN AND MULTIPLE ACCOUNTIBILITIES DISORDER
ICANN  is  an organization  which  was  first  established  as  a controllable
organization,  acting  on the behalf  of the US  Government.  The US  is  its
superior, which must be satisfied with the actions of ICANN. However, its
goal  is  to satisfy  different  groups  of actors  on the Internet  field  as  well
(for example,  potential  owners  of TLDs,  constituents).  That  further
37 Ibid., p. 96.
38 Ibid., p. 96.
39 Ibid., p. 96-97.
40 Ibid., pp. 97-98.
41 Ibid., p. 98.
42 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
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establishes  accountability  in the means  of responsiveness.  ICANN  itself
desires to be responsive, to act on the basis of the needs of the community,
but  this  notion  sometimes  clashes  with  other  responsibilities  of ICANN.
ICANN’s biggest struggle is with responsibility, since it failed to follow its
own  procedural  norms  repeatedly  in the past,  even  to the extent  that  its
elected officials were publicly criticizing the approach.43
When  an organization  fails  to satisfy  some  of these  different  notions
of accountability,  it  is  simply  marked  as non-accountable.  The different
meanings of the term are ignored,  as  Koppell  states  in his  article.  Hence,
if one focuses on responsibility, let’s say, s/he would label ICANN as non-
accountable,  even  though  it  would  satisfy  the criteria  for responsiveness.
This creates pressure on the organization. Every entity should be by design
accountable only in the sense that is necessary for its proper function.
Those  organizations,  which  behave  on the basis  of incentives  from
multiple  entities,  then  suffer  from something  Koppell  calls  the “multiple
accountabilities  disorder”,  in other  words  the “MAD”  problem.  Such
organization  is  expected  to be  accountable  in every  sense,  and that  is
a challenge, if not impossible.  The organization will sometimes emphasize
the directives  of principals,  while  at other  times  trying  to focus
on customers. In the long run, everyone is displeased.44
4. TRANSFORMATION OF ICANN
ICANN was always aware of the problem with its unclear accountability.
The US thought  that  the creation of ICANN as  a private  corporation will
soothe the critics  of the on-going  oversight  of US  Government
over the Internet.  But  even  after  the transformation  of IANA  functions
to ICANN,  contracts  with  the Department  of Commerce  were  still  intact.
ICANN dealt with the problem by multiple means, but the biggest changes
came in three steps, the first of which was the Affirmation of Commitments
from 2009, revisiting the ICANN-US relationship, followed by the creation
of Cross Community Working Group in 2014 preparing the final departure
of ICANN from the US government and dealing with accountability issues,
finalized in 2016 by the IANA transition. As you can see, the major changes
43 Froomkin, A. M. (2003) Habermas@ discourse. net: Toward a critical theory of cyberspace.
Harvard Law Review, 116, pp. 749-873.
44 Koppell, J. G. (2005) Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple
accountabilities disorder”. Public Administration Review, 65, 94-108, p. 99.
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have been made just recently, and it is still too early to say if they served
their purpose.
4.1 AFFIRMATION OF COMMITMENTS
On September  30,  2009,  the US  Department  of Commerce  signed
an Affirmation of Commitments with ICANN to review their relationship.
The ICANN  CEO  states  that  ICANN  remains  a private  non-profit
organization,  not  under  control  of a single  entity  and reviewed by public
scrutiny.45 The US  relationship  with  ICANN  was  maintained  through
a series  of contracts,  the most  important  of which  is  the Memorandum
of Understanding, which later transitioned into the Joint Project Agreement
(2008) and the IANA contract.46
As  the IANA  contract  was  about  to expire  in 2011,  there  was  a hope
for ICANN  to gain  more  independence.  However,  the Affirmation
of Commitments  does  not  cover  the future  of the IANA  contract  at all,
resulting in doubt that an actual change will happen. Still, the Affirmation
grants ICANN more independence, and it is clear that the US Government
is  willing  to address  the critique  for not  letting  ICANN  be  free.  This  is
proven  by the commitment  of the US  not  to prolong  the Joint  Project
Agreement, as is stated in the first paragraph of the Affirmation.47
The rest  of the stipulations  not  to interfere  with  ICANN  tasks  made
by the Department  of Commerce,  even  though  promising,  are  not  to be
taken for granted. There is no enforceability of such statements.
4.2 CROSS-COMMUNITY WORKING GROUP
Enhancing ICANN accountability became the primary goal  of the ICANN
community.  In 2014,  an intention  to evaluate  ICANN  accountability  was
laid  down,  and for that  purpose  a Cross-Community  Working  Group
on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (herein after “CCWG”) was created.
All  the criticism  on ICANN  during  its  short  existence  made  clear  that
ICANN  needs  to review  its  accountability  standards  to satisfy  its
constituents.
The promises  in the Affirmation  of Commitments  were  held  after  all,
and the US  Government  let  the Joint  Project  Agreement  expire.  New
45 Froomkin,  A.  M.  (2011)  Almost  Free:  an Analysis  of ICANN`s  ‘Affirmation
of Commitments’. Journal of Telecommunications and High Technology Law, 9, p. 188.
46 Ibid., p. 192.
47 Ibid., p. 198.
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revision  mechanisms  were  needed  to compensate  for the loss
of the principal.48 Since  the IANA  contract  was  prolonged  only  for it
to expire  in 2016  instead  of 2011,  another  important  matter  was  to be
discussed.
Unfortunately, the first ICANN proposal to create a revisory body was
not  met  pleasantly  by the public.  A community  driven  change  was
demanded.  A CCWG  was  formed  as a result  of a meeting  convened
by the board in Los Angeles.49 The CCWG was  established as a body that
was  proposed  by the multistakeholder  community,  to be  run
by the community, and accessible to anyone willing to contribute.50
The CCWG has two goals,  represented by two separate  work streams.
One  is  to propose  solutions  for enhancing  ICANN’s  accountability
within the time  frame  of IANA  transition.  The second  goal  is  to focus
on addressing accountability topics unrelated to The transition that can be
implemented after the transition.51
4.3 NEW BYLAWS
The first  proposal  by the CCWG  was  drafted  in May  2015.52 It  proposes
to amend  the bylaws  of ICANN  to specify  what  ICANN  does — not
changing it, just clarifying. New revisory mechanisms should be adopted
to control that ICANN stays within the limits of the bylaws and the purpose
stated therein.  This Independent  Review Process  will  be  granted powers
to reject  or  approve  changes  to the bylaws,  reject  proposals  (budget,
operating  and strategic  plans),  remove  a member  of the board  or to recall
the entire board. The goal of this provision is to be able to resolve a situation
when there is an impasse in finding a consensus.53
New bylaws  were  adopted  on May  27,  2016  as  a result  of the CCWG
efforts. Article III of the bylaws is dealing with Transparency, and Article IV
is  designated  to Accountability  and Review.54 The bylaws  propose
to enhance  transparency  by the pledge  to make  information  on its  tasks
48 ICANN  accountability. [online]  Available from:  https://icannwiki.com/ICANN_
Accountability [Accessed 5 December 2016].
49 Ibid.
50 The working progress can be observed and the effort joined here: https://community.icann.
org/display/acctcrosscomm/WS1+-+Enhancing+ICANN+Accountability.
51 2014.  Cross Community  Working  Group  (CCWG)  Charter. [online]  Available from:  https://
www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-11-05-en [Accessed 14 January 2017], p. 2.
52 ICANN accountability. [online]  Available from:  https://icannwiki.com/ICANN_
Accountability [Accessed 5 December 2016]. 
53 Ibid.
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and meetings  publicly  available  and for that  purpose  adopt  a new
Documentary  Information  Disclosure  Policy  and Independent  Review
proceedings.
Revised accountability mechanisms include the following instruments:
• Reconsideration Process,  which  allows  those  materially  affected
by ICANN  decisions to request  a reconsideration  of that  action
by the Board;
• Independent Review Process, which allows those eligible to request
Reconsideration  Process  to request  also  a review  by a third
independent party, if ICANN performs an action that can be deemed
to be in collision with the bylaws.  The result of such Review is then
published on the ICANN webpage.
• Ombudsman,  which  is  an independent  entity,  who  can  evaluate
the complaints  of members  of the ICANN  community  who  are
deemed to be  treated  unfairly  by a member  of ICANN staff,  Board
or constituent body.55
4.4 IANA STEWARDSHIP TRANSITION
In March  2014,  the intent  to hand  over  IANA  functions  to the global
multistakeholder community was announced. Since that meant abandoning
the historical  contractual  relationship  with the US,  the CCWG  was  also
given  the task  to consider  the impact  of the transition  on ICANN’s
accountability.
On October 10, 2016, the contract between IANA and the US Department
of Commerce  expired.56 Following  a long  process  starting  in 201457
preparing  the transition  of IANA  to the hands  of the Internet  global
community,  the cord  between  ICANN  and the US  Government,
representing 20 years of development, was cut.
54 BYLAWS for INTERNET CORPORATION for ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS. [online]
Available from:  https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/bylaws-2016-02-16-en [Accessed  5
December 2016].
55 Accountability Mechanisms. [online] Available from: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/
mechanisms-2014-03-20-en [Accessed 10 December 2016].
56 Stewardship of IANA Functions Transitions to Global Internet Community as Contract with U.S.
Government Ends. [online]  Available from:  https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-
2016-10-01-en [Accessed 14 December 2016].
57 The process  of the transition  is  available  to public  scrutiny  here:  https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/transition-2014-03-23-en
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Regardless  of how  dramatically  the “hand-over  of the Internet”  was
perceived  by media,  from  the viewpoint  of an ordinary  user,  nothing
changes.  But  those,  who  are  interested  in participating,  can  sign  up
to a newsletter and watch the progress online.58
5. ICANN IN THE PRESENT
As Koppell states, the MAD problem is bestowed upon those organizations
that are trying to listen to commands from multiple sources. Therefore, it
can be  partially fixed by clarifying the goal  of the organization and acting
accordingly  with the sole  purpose  of achieving  that  goal.  The problem
of ICANN  was  its  need  to respond  to commands  from  above,  as  well
as from the bottom. Since the cord to the US Government was recently cut,
ICANN can now fully focus on satisfying the Internet community.
Nevertheless,  keep  in mind that  the power  to control  an agency
operating  in a complex,  technical  area  is  always  small,  since  a citizen’s
ability to make resolved judgment in the field is limited.59 Such a company
will always have broader borders for its behaviour. Now, with the election
process established for ICANN, there is at least  a way to make the elected
officials liable for their unsatisfying actions and to remove them from office.
And  with the US  Government  out  of the picture,  ICANN  is  now  not
divided between its principal and its constituents.
From  2014,  when  the preparation  for the transition  started,  ICANN
claims to be willing to hear out everyone who wants to participate, the same
as its  role  model  IETF  does.  The only  difference  between  a member
appointed by a chartering organization and an individual participant is that
the unappointed  participant  cannot  have  a say  in a consensus  call
or a decision.60
Even  after  the transition,  ICANN  remains  dependant  on multiple
contracts  granting  it  its  power.  This  organisation  does  not  derive
from traditional  legislative  bodies  and is  not  governed by public
international law.61 Criticism may not be the only result of ICANNs specific
nature, as there are already judicial disputes over its legitimacy.
58 Sign up to a newsletter is available on https://icannwiki.com/
59 Koppell, J. G. (2005) Pathologies of accountability: ICANN and the challenge of “multiple
accountabilities disorder”. Public Administration Review, 65, 94-108, p. 97.
60 2014.  Cross  Community  Working  Group  (CCWG) Charter. [online]  Available from:  https://
www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-11-05-en [Accessed 14 January 2017], p. 5.
61 See Chapter 4 in Bygrave,  L.  A. (2015)  Internet  Governance by Contract,  Oxford University
Press.
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In 2006,  Danish  Supreme  Court  dealt  with  the question,  whereas
the Memorandum of Understanding (later  transformed in the Joint Project
Agreement,  as  discussed  above)  signed  between  ICANN  and US
Department  of Commerce  gives  ICANN  the competence  to manage  .dk
domains.  The decision  was,  that  it  is  indeed  possible  to constitute  legal
competence by delegation via contract.62
Similar  issue  concerning  ICANN’s  power  over  area  specific  domains
was raised in front of California Superior Court.  The case revolved around
the right to delegate the .africa top level domain, a dispute between ICANN
and DotConnectAfrica  (DCA)  originating  in 2013.  Both  preliminary
injunctions by DCA were dismissed so far.63
6. CONCLUSION
The transition  of ICANN  does  not  fix  all  its  problems.  Only  a legal
framework  could  amend  the shortcomings  with  the responsibility
dimension  of accountability.  So  far,  there  are  no  legal  requirements
for ICANN. ICANN is trying to compensate for the lack of it by setting out
its own behavioural norms and policies. Despite that, it can be expected that
its unclear responsibility will remain a major issue for ICANN and will be
challenged once more in the future.
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